In einem auf drei Bände angelegten Dokumentationswerk werden Entstehung und Ausbreitung des Paracelsismus in den kontroversen Verflechtungen der Wissenschafts-, Literatur- und Sozialgeschichte des späten 16. Jahrhunderts verankert. Die kritische Edition aufschlußreicher, oft in unbekanntes Terrain führender Texte ist begleitet von umfangreichen Kommentaren sowie von biographischen Darstellungen der Urheber, Adressaten, Gegner bzw. Sympathisanten der paracelsistischen Reform und Protestbewegung. Der zweite Band des »Corpus Paracelsisticum« erschließt das weitläufige Oeuvre von Michael Toxites und Gerhard Dorn, wirkmächtige Gründergestalten des oberrheinischen Paracelsismus. Von da aus (...) fällt der Blick quer über die Konfessionsgrenzen auf andere kulturelle Zentren in Bayern, Sachsen, Schlesien, Böhmen und am Niederrhein. Mit Verfassern wie G. Fedro, M. Ambrosius, L. Span, B. Flöter, G. Etschenreutter, B. Scultetus, P. Perna, Th. Zwinger und J. Albrecht eröffnet sich ein epochaler, äußerst weitläufiger Diskurszusammenhang. In ihm lassen sich doxographische, methodische, hermeneutische, sprachtheoretische und überlieferungsspezifische Auseinandersetzungen ebenso beobachten wie Tendenzen einer theosophischen Spiritualisierung und heterodoxen Aufladung der in Paracelsus' Namen entwickelten Anthropologie und Kosmologie. Direkte Verbindungen ergeben sich unter anderem zu führenden Vertretern der sogenannten Schwenckfelder, damit auch zu Fraktionen aktiver protestantischer Dissidenten. Der Band wird neben dem weiterführenden Kommentar begleitet von einer ausführlichen Einleitung und erschlossen nicht nur durch mehrere Register, sondern auch durch wissenschaftshistorische Zusammenfassungen zu jedem Autorcorpus. (shrink)

As we owe the division of ecology into autecology and synecology to botanists, the arguments for this subdivision and also the definitions and contents of both subsciences as given bySchröter, Flahault &Schröter, Gams andDu Rietz are communicated in full. The same is the case with the division of ecology given by the zoologistsAdams andChapman. Moreover the opinions of these authors in this respect are critisized in detail as well as in their general aspects. This critique is connected with the author's (...) own positive opinion, which is given at the end of the paper, where also the remarks covered by the first two papers of this series are summarised.In ecology as a biological science either the individual or the complex of individuals has to occupy a central position. Therefore science about the environment, especially the abiotic one, as well as science about a definite region or spot of the earth ought not to be incorporated in biology.In autecology the individual occupies a central position, it is one of the subsciences of idiobiology, it is a science about the relations to environment, taken in the broadest sense. Dependent upon the contents of this we have many definitions of ecology, the most important ones being: 1) ecology is a biogeographical subscience; 2) ecology is taken in the sense of ethology; 3) ecology is taken as a science of the teleological relations of the individual to its environment and the objects in it, thus of the non-causal relations, the causal ones being assigned to physiology. These non-causal relations appear under four aspects, all called teleological, i.e. the true purpose-notion, relation in the sense of requirement, that in the sense of wholeness, and of adaptation and the degree of adaptation. Adaptation is taken in a broad sense, covering as well the degree of adaptation , as the latitude of the possibility of adaptation and the degree of variability of the individual to adapt itself. The proposal is made to confine the term autecology to this teleological aspect of the relations of the individual, i.e. of all its characters, not of the epharmonic ones only, to environment.In synecology the complex of individuals, showing direct real connections during individual life, occupies a central position, with equal scientific interest for all members of the complex. Synecology contains all biological scientific contents about this matter. The application ofTschulok's system of subsciences to synecology is critisized and the development of the system of these subsciences is left to its developmental fate in time. Considering the importance of the knowledge of the tendencies of thought for the development of synecology an attempt is made to state those already applied in synecology; author distinguishes the systematical, the mathematical, the causal, the historical, the teleological and the essential tendency of thought. Also the difference in the tendencies of thought shows that autecology and synecology are to be separated in a logical system of biological subsciences.Puisque c'est aux botanistes que nous devons la division de l'écologie en autécologie et synécologie, l'auteur passe en revue tous les arguments qui ont amené les biologistes à faire cette subdivision, ainsi que les définitions de ces deux subsciences et les matières qu'elles comprennent, comme elles sont données parSchröter, Flahault &Schröter, Gams etdu Rietz. Il en fait de même pour la division de l'écologie faite par les zoologistesAdams etChapman. En outre il discute les opinions de ces auteurs sous ce rapport, dans leurs détails aussi bien que dans leurs aspects généraux. Cette discussion est en rapport avec l'opinion positive de l'auteur, qu'il expose à la fin de l'article, où se trouvent résumées également les remarques qui se trouvaient déjà dans les deux premiers articles de cette série.Dans l'écologie, en tant que science biologique, l'individu — ou bien l'ensemble des individus — doit occuper une position centrale. C'est pourquoi ni la science qui concerne le milieu, en particulier le milieu abiotique, ni la science qui se rapporte à une région ou un endroit défini de la terre, ne devrait être incorporée dans la biologie.Dans l'autécologie l'individu occupe une position centrale. Cette science est une des subsciences de l'idiobiologie; elle se rapporte aux relations entre le sujet et son milieu — „milieu” pris dans le sens le plus large du mot. Selon les significations diverses qu'on peut attacher aux termes „relations” et „milieu”, nous avons plusieurs définitions de l'écologie, parmi lesquelles les plus importantes suivent ci-dessous:1)L'écologie est une subscience biogéographique; 2) le terme „écologie” est pris dans le sens d'éthologie; 3) l'écologie est considérée comme la science des relations téléologiques entre l'individu et son milieu et les objets se trouvant dans ce milieu; elle est donc considérée comme la science des relations non-causales, les relations causales étant conférées à la physiologie. Ces relations non-causales se présentent sous quatre aspects, tous appelés téléologiques, c. à. d. la vraie notion de but, les relations dans le sens de besoins, les relations dans le sens de „tout” et les relations dans le sens d'adaptation et de degré d'adaptation.Le mot „adaptation” est pris dans un sens étendu, comprenant aussi bien le degré d'adaptation que l'amplitude de la possibilité d'adaptation et le degré de variabilité dans l'adaptation de l'individu à son milieu. L'auteur propose de restreindre le terme „autécologie” à cet aspect téléologique des relations entre l'individu et son milieu; il s'agit ici, bien entendu, de toutes les qualités de l'individu et non seulement des qualités epharmoniques.Dans la synécologie l'ensemble des individus montrant des rapports directs et réels durant la vie individuelle occupe une position centrale et offre un intérêt scientifique pareil pour tous les membres de l'ensemble. La synécologie comprend tout ce qu'il y a à dire sur cette matière par rapport à la science biologique. L'application du système des subsciences deTschulok à la synécologie est critiquée par l'auteur, qui juge prématuré de s'occuper déjà d'un tel système de subsciences: l'avenir seul nous apprendra quel système se développera ici. Vu l'importance d'une connaissance exacte des différentes tendances de penser pour le développement de la synécologie, l'auteur s'efforce de rassembler celles qui ont déjà été appliquées dans la synécologie; il distingue les tendances de penser systématique, mathématique, causale, historique, téléologique et essentielle . En outre les différences entre ces tendances de penser démontrent, que l'autécologie et la synécologie doivent être séparées dans un système logique de subsciences biologiques. (shrink)

I analyze three forms of the slippery slope argument (two logical and one empirical) using two questions: 1) in the context of what kind of norms are we considering a first step on a possible slope: statute law, precedent law, positive morality, or critical morality? 2) What is meant by "If we allow this first step"? The conclusion is that the argument's greatest force is in a context of institutionalized norms, like law, whereas its importance in morality is only marginal.

In this thesis, I investigate realist, anti-realist and pluralist views in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of complexity. The philosophy of science can inform the philosophy of complexity and vice versa because we can consider scientific inquiry to largely involve the study of complex systems. I however find that the relevant realist, anti-realist and pluralist views are problematic in various ways, and that a version of pragmatism suggests a promising alternative. This version of pragmatism incorporates elements of pluralism, (...) but maintains a commitment to epistemic hierarchy, convergence and progress. The way to develop such a version of pragmatism is, I argue, by rebooting William Whewell’s 19th century philosophy of science. Whewell however held to the following two transcendental claims: 1. Empirical inquiry undertaken in science properly practiced can reveal necessary truths. 2. The revelation of such necessary truths grants us a glimpse of the mind of God. Such transcendental claims are obviously at odds with pragmatism. There are however core features of Whewell’s view that are notably pragmatist in nature, features that explicitly inspired Charles Sanders Piece’s convergent pragmatism. These are as follows: 3. Subject and object (or mind and world) are inextricably entwined during scientific inquiry; they are not separated by anything like a correspondence relationship. 4. Science progresses via what Whewell calls the consilience of inductions (an ongoing merging of scientific theories, a merging that increases our understanding of the world over time). I modify Whewell’s view by stripping away its transcendental elements while maintaining its pragmatist elements. What remains is, I argue, a robust and novel kind of pragmatism suitable for being introduced into the contemporary philosophy of science. Whewell suitably-pragmatised can offer new insights into ongoing debates, particularly those around the nature of scientific progress, scientific truth and scientific understanding. (shrink)

The label ‘Translational Research’ (TR) has become ever more popular in the biomedical domain in recent years. It is usually presented as an attempt to bridge a supposed gap between knowledge produced at the lab bench and its use at the clinical bedside. This is claimed to help society harvest the benefits of its investments in scientific research. The rhetorical as well as moral force of the label TR obscure, however, that it is actually used in very different ways. In (...) this paper, we analyse the scientific discourse on TR, with the aim to disentangle and critically evaluate the different meanings of the label. We start with a brief reconstruction of the history of the concept. Subsequently, we unravel how the label is actually used in a sample of scientific publications on TR and examine the presuppositions implied by different views of TR. We argue that it is useful to distinguish different views of TR on the basis of three dimensions, related to (1) the construction of the ‘translational gap’; (2) the model of the translational process; and (3) the cause of the perceived translational gap. We conclude that the motive to make society benefit from its investments in biomedical science may be laudable, but that it is doubtful whether the dominant views of TR will contribute to this end. (shrink)

BackgroundThe interpretation of clinical gait data in children with cerebral palsy (CP) is time-consuming, requires extensive expertise and often lacks transparency. Here we aimed to develop a set of look-up tables to support this process, linking typical gait features as present in CP to their potential underlying impairments.MethodsWe developed an initial core set of gait features and their potential underlying impairments based on biomechanical reasoning, literature and clinical experience. This core set was further specified through a Delphi process in a (...) multidisciplinary group of experts in gait analysis of children with CP and evaluated on 20 patient cases. The likelihood of the listed gait feature–impairment relationships was scored by the expert panel on a five-point scale.ResultsThe final core set included 120 relevant gait feature–impairment relations including likelihood scores. This set was presented in the form of look-up tables in both directions, i.e., sorted by gait features with potential underlying impairment, and sorted by impairments with potential related gait features. The average likelihood score for the relations was 3.5 ± 0.6 (range 2.1–4.6).ConclusionThe developed set of look-up tables linking gait features and impairments, can assist gait analysts and clinicians in standardized biomechanical reasoning, to support treatment decision-making for gait impairments in children with CP. (shrink)

Normative ethics is concerned with reflection on moral problems. It does so through the analysis of moral reasons. In this chapter we explain what a moral problem is, why some moral problems should be classified as problems of will, some as cognitive problems, and describe the difference between motivations and reasons. The chapter then provides an overview of three types of moral reasons: (1) reasons that derive from the consequences of our actions, (2) reasons that concern the acts themselves (principles), (...) and (3) reasons that concern our own character (virtues). To arrive at a moral judgments, these reasons need to be weighed, which requires making an ethical judgment. (shrink)